#### MEMORALDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Analysis of Seviet Press and Radio Reaction

REFERENCE: a. CED #S-417 dated 28 March 1949, signed by Mr. John H. Chly

ENGLOSURE: A. Two copies IN-158, dated 14 April 1949: Seviet Press and Radio Reaction to the First Public Amesocount of the Atomic Boab

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#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 April 1949

#### INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 158

SUBJECT: Soviet Press and Radio Reaction to the first Public Announcement of the Atomic Bomb.

We have been requested to prepare a comparative study of Soviet press and radio reaction to the first public announcement of three items concerned with unconventional weapons of war: the atomic bomb, the Merck Report, and Mr. Forrestal's press release of 13 March 1949 on biological warfare. We have been given to understand that the purpose of this report is to afford guidance in the release of information on subsequent developments in these and other fields.

Close investigation of the scientific periodicals <u>Priroda</u> and <u>Nauka I Zhizn</u>' to the end of 1946, and Moscow papers from 3 January to 6 February 1946, and monitoring of Soviet broadcasts from 3 January to 28 February 1946, have revealed no press and radio reaction whatsoever to the Merck Report. Current processing of Soviet newspapers and radio broadcasts has as yet revealed no reaction to the Forrestal release. We are, therefore, unable to provide the comparisons requested. The single item on BW (Appendix D, p. 8) cannot be directly related to the release of the Merck Report or Mr. Forrestal's statement.

Our report, which is attached as Appendix A, is based upon careful scrutiny of Soviet press and radio material. It examines in some detail the reaction to the first announcement of the atomic bomb. Appended also are

Appendix B - Chronology of Coverage

Appendix C - Digest of Press Reports

Appendix D - Digest of Radio Broadcasts

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#### APPENDIX A

## ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

# A. Press and Radio Coverage.

Announcement of the dropping of the first combat atomic bomb on Hiroshima was made in a White House communique on 6 August; the announcement was printed immediately in the Moscow papers of 7 and 8 August as a news item paraphrasing the communique. It appeared in similar form in the provincial papers the following few days. There was thus no attempt to delay the first announcement, but editorial comment was withheld for more than a week. !/ On the other hand, no announcement was made of the Nagasaki bomb (dropped 8 August) until 1 September, when it appeared in a periodical of limited circulation. It was not further mentioned until after the end of the year.  $\frac{2}{}$  References to the Nagasaki bomb which appeared in US statements and speeches were apparently deliberately omitted in the Soviet summaries, at least up to the beginning of 1946. Press and radio silence on the Nagasaki bomb is attributable possibly to the immediately prior Soviet entry into the Pacific War and possibly to a desire to conceal the US capacity to produce more than one atomic bomb, or possibly to both.

# B. Phasing.

Soviet interest in the atomic bomb was not transitory, and atomic energy remained a subject of continuing interest in the Soviet press and radio. Its treatment appears to fall into three phases:

(a) <u>Initial phase</u> (from the first announcement to the armistice on 1 September): In this phase, reporting was largely in the form of brief news items, given little prominence, and generally subordinated to news of the victory in the Far East. There was little

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<sup>1/</sup> Some "editorializing" was done in an English-language broadcast, beamed to the United Kingdom on 9 August 1945. (Appendix D, p 2.)

<sup>2/</sup> An early Soviet mention of the Nagasaki bomb appeared in a small book on nuclear energy by Ya. I. Frenkel', published in 1946; its preface was dated October 1945. This almost appears to have been an oversight.

editorial comment. Articles (as distinct from news items) tended to stress the entry of the USSR into the Pacific War and directly or by implication to minimize the effect of the atomic bomb as a factor in the collapse of Japan. The general impression is that the announcement of the atomic bomb was submerged by the mass of reports on the Soviet victory over Japan. Dozens of articles reported military operations, mostly of local importance, mentioning many persons even of lower rank.

This handling of the question appears to indicate (a) initial uncertainty as to how to treat it; and (b) an early recognition of the military significance of the bomb and the need to minimize it.

The predominant effort of the Soviet press and radio in this phase appears to have been to belittle the importance of the weapon, not only through the space allotted to the items on it, but also in the content of editorial comment and articles.

(b) Second phase (from the end of the war to the end of November 1945): In this phase, the increasing but still intermittent and scanty references in the press consisted largely of articles on the scientific aspects of atomic energy and the wider political implications of the bomb. Articles dwelt on the secretive attitude of the US respecting production techniques, and gave relatively large coverage to the Molotov speech of 6 November and the statement of the Western leaders that they were determined to preserve the secret of the atomic bomb. Popular interest in atomic energy appears to have outrun material available in the Russian press. Two numbers of British Ally (a Soviet Ministry of Information publication) dealing with the subject were commanding a blackmarket figure thirty times their list-price in October. In the following month a public lecture on atomic energy was announced.

During this phase the fact of secrecy was freely depreciated, and the theories upon which the atomic bomb was based were claimed as common knowledge. It was optimistically promised that the secrets of production could not long remain in US hands. Molotov declared that, "We shall have atomic energy and more." Soviet research in atomic energy and in cosmic rays was stressed, with the emphasis always upon the peaceful uses to which these would be put.

On the other hand, while depreciating the fact of secrecy, the Soviet press and radio belabored the US for keeping the secret, reading into this an intent to use the atomic bomb as a diplomatic weapon, and perhaps ultimately as a military weapon directed against the USSR itself. In comments on the foreign press, both the press and radio disparaged articles which urged the retention of the secret and extolled those which advocated its being shared.

Up to this point, the Soviet attitude may be summarized as follows:

- (a) The atomic bomb is not a decisive weapon in warfare;
- (b) Atomic energy and its use are not a secret;
- (c) Use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of coercion by one nation cannot be allowed:
- (d) The monopoly of the secret of production poisons international relations.
- (c) Third phase (beginning with the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in December 1945 and continuing to the present): This phase, only partly covered by this report, shows the Soviet press and radio concerned with problems of the international control of atomic energy. The Soviet press and radio generally followed world press coverage, reflected the appearance of the question before the UN, and covered US announcements in the field. The Bikini tests (A and B) were reported in somewhat critical and at the same time flippant terms; the Eniwetok tests were not mentioned.

#### APPENDIX B

#### CHRONOLOGY OF COVERAGE

Note: This Chronology has been based upon sources wider than those contained in APPENDIX C and APPENDIX D for the purpose of reflecting more perfectly the volume and occurrence of the reaction.

## 1945

- 7 Aug. PRAVDA, IZVESTIA, RED FLEET, TRUD, KOMSOMOISKAYA PRAVDA, carried announcement (President Truman's official statement).
- 8 Aug. PRAVDA again carries brief announcement.
- 9 Aug. Moscow Radio commentary criticizes foreign press reaction.
- President Truman's broadcast of 9 Aug. reported in all Soviet papers. Speech reported in full except for last seven paragraphs, which are omitted.
- 12 Aug. Moscow Radio brief reference to Truman speech and the atom bomb.
- 16 Aug. IZVESTIA editorial containing brief reference to bomb.

  Moscow Radio first reference to military significance of bomb.
- 17 Aug. Moscow Radio commentary plays down atom bombings.
- 19 Aug. NEW TIMES article quotes British article re atom bombings.
- 21 Aug. SOVIET NEWS quotes Mountbatten's statement on the atom bomb.
- 26 Aug. NEW TIMES again quotes British article.
- Sept. SPUTNIK AGITATORA scientific article on atomic energy.
- 1 Sept. NEW TIMES, lengthy article (six pages).
  NOVOYE VREMYA (Periodical) two long articles (several pages)
  minimizing atomic bomb.
- 2 Sept. NEW TIMES, No. 7, statement re capitalistic use of atomic energy.

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- 4 Sept. Moscow Radio commentary on political implications of bomb.
- 6 Sept. Moscow Radio broadcasts shortened version of NEW TIMES 1 Sept. article
- 8 Sept. IZVESTIA scientific article brief reference to atomic energy
- 9 Sept. PRAVDA and Moscow Radio reference (approx. one para.) to atomic bomb as diplomatic "lever".
- ll Sept. Moscow Radio broadcasts RED STAR article playing down the bombings.
- 15 Sept. NEW TIMES, short article re sharing atomic bomb secret.
- 20 Sept. KOMSOMOISKAYA PRAVDA scientific article on structure of atom.
- 21 Sept. PRAVDA quotes statement by Eaker on continued US research work.

  Moscow Radio commentary atom bomb as a subject to arouse split in Allied unity
- 22 Sept. KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA scientific article on the atom.
- 30 Sept. RED STAR and RED FLEET carry translation of British article on US UK atomic defense
- 9 Oct. PRAVDA and IZVESTIA report American scientists protest against secrecy surrounding bomb.

  Moscow Radio brief commentary on secrecy of bomb.
- 10 Oct. PRAVDA and IZVESTIA Il-line report on Truman statement that America was not prepared to disclose secret of atomic bomb.
- 12 Oct. Moscow Radio short commentary on US-UK slanderous attacks on USSR. (Atom bomb instead of international cooperation.)
- 15 Oct. NEW TIMES quotes British editorial on secrecy of bomb. (Three paragraphs.)
- 18 Oct. IZVESTIA short, tart comment on Turkish article re use of atomic bomb on Balkans.

  Moscow Radio broadcasts same article.
- 19 Oct. RED STAR article playing down psychological effect of bomb on Japanese.

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1945

25 Oct. Moscow press carries Truman message to Congress. Text in part. No comment.

28 Oct. Moscow press carries Truman Navy Day speech with four omissions (all references to the bomb). No comment.

29 Oct. Moscow radio - brief commentary on influence of atom bomb on US foreign policy.

30 Oct. Moscow Radio - short reference to bomb and the Turkish suggestion of its use on Balkans.

1 Nov. NEW TIMES article - three and one-half pages - analysis of foreign press reaction to Truman's 3 Oct. message to Congress re secrecy surrounding bomb.

5 Nov. Moscow Radio repetition of 30 Oct. broadcast mentioned above.

6 Nov. Moscow press and radio carry Molotov speech (one hour).

7 Nov.) Moscow press and radio carry selected comments on Molotov's 8 Nov.) speech (approximately seven paragraphs).

9 Nov.) Moscow press carries summaries of Bevin and Churchill speeches 10 Nov.) re atom bomb. Moscow Radio broadcasts similar summaries.

11 Nov. Moscow Radio commentary on Molotov speech.

PRAVDA - lengthy attack on British ECONOMIST article which referred to Molotov speech.

Moscow press - brief TASS report on atomic energy discussions in Washington.

12 Nov. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA announces lecture on atomic energy.

14 Nov. NEW TIMES - articles (two - five pages) dealing with atom bomb.

15 Nov. Moscow Radio reports building of astrophysics laboratory.

16 Nov. Moscow Radio - brief Washington TASS announcement of Joint Communique.

17 Nov. Moscow press publishes Washington Joint Communique in part.

SCIENCE and LIFE, No. 7 - seven-page article on construction of atom.

20 Nov. TRUD carries comments from US press on Truman-Atlee-King statement.

22 Nov. Moscow Radio broadcasts two NEW TIMES articles (see 14 Nov. above).

1945

23 Nov. Moscow Radio - summary of Attlee's speech on Joint Communique.

25 Nov. KOMSCMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article - brief reference to atom bomb.

26 Nov. Moscow Radio commentary on Turkish suggestion to use bomb on Balkans.

30 Nov. TRUD quotes a US labor union letter to Truman re the atom bomb.

28 Dec. Moscow press - full page - final statement on Conference.

Chapter VII dealing with establishment of Commission given special notice on another page.

1946

3 July Moscow press reports Bikini test (based on N.Y. TASS report).

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# APPENDIX C

# SOVIET PRESS REACTIONS TO THE FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ATOMIC BOMB

Compiled by the

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

GEODES.

#### APPENDIX C

TRUMAN ANNOUNCES NEW ATOMIC BOMB - Trud, 7 Aug 1945

The White House has released an announcement by President Truman. The announcement reads: "Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped on the important Japanese base, Hiroshima (on the Island of Honshu), a bomb, the destructive power of which surpasses that of 20,000 tons of explosives. The destructive power of this bomb is 2,000 times greater than that of the British bomb "Grand Slam" which was the most powerful bomb ever used in the history of war."

atomic energy only theoretically possible, since no practical methods for such use were known. By 1942, however, we learned that the Germans were working intensively to find a means of using atomic energy as a supplement to other weapons of warfare with which they hoped to enslave the world. They did not succeed."

Truman further disclosed that in July 1946, even before Pearl Harbor, the US and Great Britain had pooled whatever scientific knowledge they had which might serve for military purposes. The experimental work for the atomic bomb was done in accordance with this policy of common exchange of scientific knowledge.

Truman revealed that at present there are in the US two large plants and a number of smaller enterprises connected with the production of atomic weapons. During the period of most intensive atomic bomb production, 125,000 workers were employed in these plants, and over 65,000 still are employed. Many workers have spent two and a half years

in this work. Only a few of them knew what they were producing.

"At the present time," said Truman, "we are determined to destroy as rapidly and completely as possible all industrial enterprises which Japan may have in any city. We shall destroy their docks, factories and communications. There may be no mistake: we shall destroy her war potential completely. The ultimatum made at Potsdam on 26 July was delivered with the intent of saving the "apanese people for utter destruction. The leaders quickly rejected this ultimatum. If they will not accept our conditions now, they can expect such tremendous destruction from the air as the world has not yet seen.

"This air attack will be followed by attacks from sea and by land, with forces of such number and power as the Japanese have never seen, and with the same fighting ability with which the Japanese have already been acquainted."

In conclusion Truman declared that he will recommend to the US Congress that a study of the question of a committee for control and utilization of atomic energy in the US be made immediately. Truman said that he will make further recommendations to the Congress on the question of "how atomic energy can become a powerful and efficient factor in the maintenance of universal peace."

Trud - 11 Aug 1945

(Extracts from President Truman's speech on his return from Berlin)

"One of the secrets was disclosed yesterday when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. The Soviet Union agreed to participate in the Pacific war before it had been informed of the existence of our new weapon."

"It has been agreed upon in Berlin that the dapanese will soon learn some other military secrets. They will learn about these from the original source, and they will not like them."

We have defined the conditions under which Japan may capitulate.

No attention was paid to our warning, and the Japanese have since
learned what an atomic bomb can do. They can imagine what that bomb
will do in the future. The first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a
military base. This was done because we wanted that objective in the
first attack. The destruction of civilian population was prevented as
much as possible. But this attack is only a warning of what will happen
in the future. If Japan does not capitulate, bombs will be dropped on
military enterprises and unfortunately thousands of civilians will
perish. I advise Japanese civilian populations to leave industrial
cities immediately in order to save themselves from destruction."

Izvestiya - 16 Aug 1945

It is true that some American newspapers are trying to minimize the contribution of the Soviet Union to the common cause of the Allies. For example, the New York paper Daily News boasts: "We could win the war with the help of the atom bomb." The sensation of the atom bomb has indeed obscured the minds of some people. They are prepared to transform science into a shamanistic invocation. It is worth while to remember the very sound remark made by Lord Mountbatten in London. He stated at a press conference on 9 August: "It would be the greatest mistake to start with the assumption that the atom bomb can make an end to the war." This is not the conjecture of a publicist, amusing himself with illusions in a field unfamiliar to him, but an authoritative and sobering statement of an experienced military leader, Commander—in—Chief of the Allied Forces in south—east Asia.

The war will be ended not by sensational miracles, but by powerful joint efforts of all Allies, who have conquered with common weapons both Hitler Germany and imperialistic Japan.

Novoye Vremya, No. 7, 1 Sept 1945

END OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC, by Col. M. Tolchenov

By the beginning of August of this year, quite a peculiar situation had come about in the Pacific theatre of military operations. Land operations were being carried on in Burma, on the Island of Borneo and on some other islands in the southern Pacific. But the operations in these regions were really of secondary importance from the viewpoint of the war as a whole.

Describing the situation prevailing then, the American military observer Swing wrote: "We are now on the threshold of Japan. Yet did not penetrate any part of the Japanese Islands. Our air attacks caused great damage to Japan—maybe even more than we think. However, experience of previous air bombardments has made sufficiently clear that no war can be stopped by air bombardment alone."

Numerous statements by Allied political and military leaders show that Allied commanders did not expect to achieve victory over Japan by air raids only.

On 16 August, in the House of Commons, Churchill said, "Nobody could evaluate the cost in British and American lives that would be paid for these operations..... Even less (could be estimated) the time the Japanese could hold out in conquered territories and in Japan itself."

Contentions were made in some organs of the foreign press that any hold-out resistance after the formal capitulation of Japan could be

overcome with the use of atomic bombs. However, the statement by Winston Churchill which we have quoted shows that the leading circles of the United States and Great Britain did not share such an opinion: only three weeks before the atomic bomb was used against Japan, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of the United States were planning operations which "involved efforts unknown in this war" and which would have incurred great sacrifices on the part of the Allies.

(The article goes on to deal with the preparations for invasion, and states that, according to Secretary of War Patterson, the war could not have ended before June 1946. Col. Tolchenov concludes this part of the article with the following statements:)

While the Allies would doubtlessly have routed Japan in the end, the results of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa invasions indicated how extremely costly the invasion of Japan itself would be. Even after her defeat, continued resistance on the continent could be expected.

What made the Japanese adventurers give up the idea of "defense of every inch of territory" and made them accept unconditional surrender? An overwhelming majority of the foreign press has quite properly described the entry of the Soviet Union into the war as the major factor which obliged the enemy to surrender.

(The second part of the article is entirely devoted to the contributions of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan. Quoting foreign sources, the author states that the main part of the Japanese

Army was on the continent. He stresses the importance of the Kwantung Army and notes the surprise abroad caused by the speed of the Soviet victories. Conclusion of the article follows.)

The struggle against Hitler's aggression has demonstrated to the world the firm decision of the Soviet Union to bring to an end the noble task of destroying the imperialism of the German gangsters, regardless of the enormous sacrifices and hardships entailed. When the situation demanded the Soviet Union's entry into the war against the last aggressor, imperialist Japan, the Soviet people again made this great sacrifice. By throwing all her might against the largest group of Japanese armies, the Soviet Union decisively speeded the downfall and unconditional surrender of Japan, bringing the war to an end, and opening the period of peaceful collaboration among freedom-loving peoples.

FOREIGN PRESS REACTIONS TO THE ATOMIC BOMB --Novoye Vremya, No. 7 (17), 1945

The periodical Novove Vrenze No.7, 1945, contains an article by

M. Rubinshteyn on "Foreign Press Reactions to the Atomic Bomb". The

first two pages of the article give an historical account of the

development and use of the atomic bomb. It starts with President

Truman's announcement on 6 August 1945 regarding the new atom bomb which
had been dropped on Biroshima. It is further stated that the subsequent

press publications of various countries, and especially the statements
made by political and military leaders of the United States and Great

Britain, give a detailed picture of the historical development and

organization of the work in connection with the atomic bomb, but at the
same time they avoid the question of the technical nature of processes

applied in the production of these bombs. This, says the article, is
the subject of numerous conjectures on the part of the press.

After giving a description of the coordinated work of the United States, England, and Canada in this field, and mentioning the establishment and location of various atomic bomb plants and laboratories in the United States, the article mentions that the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, and that subsequently a laboratory was established on the Marianas for the assembly of bombs from parts shipped from the United States.

The article further states: "Certain organs of the foreign press, partly due to sensationalism, and partly because of their desire to minimize the importance of a joint struggle of the Allies against the forces of aggression, hastened to declare that the prompt capitulation of Japan was the result of the action of the first atomic bombs.

However, this version did not become any more plausible even when the former Japanese imperialists subscribed to this opinion, after the capitulation of Japan. Their aim in this connection was quite obvious. It is connected with the vain attempts of Japanese militarists to save face and to justify before history the disgraceful collapse of their adventurous undertaking.

"Such a version is definitely rejected by competent circles. Thus, for instance, Commander of the Air Forces of the United States, Arnold, definitely objected to the announcement that atomic bombs had caused the surrender of Japan, when speaking at a Press conference. He stated that the situation of Japan had been hopeless even before the use of atomic bombs.

"Major General Chennault, former chief of American air forces in China, told a correspondent of New York Times:" The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan was the decisive factor, which precipitated the end of the war in the Pacific; this would have happened even if no atom bombs had been used. The sudden blow given to Japan by the Red Army completed the encirclement, which brought Japan to its knees.

"It stands to reason that the two bombs dropped on military objects in Japan do not provide sufficient grounds for a general appraisal of the importance of atomic bombs in military affairs as a whole and their effect on the further development of military technique. Nevertheless, the foreign Press contains premature conclusions, dictated by certain political calculations. For example, the well-known fascistic theorist

on tank war, Fuller, made statements to this effect; however, his prophecies regarding small, completely mechanized "robot" armies were definitely proven false by the experiences of the World War. In the pages of the London Daily Mail, Fuller declares in his usual vociferous manner that 'the Army, Navy, and Air Forces have gone out of the picture'; that 'they, figuratively speaking, have been buried under the wreckage of Hiroshima.'

war, and in particular the unrivaled experience of the Red Army victories, has clearly shown that success in war is not achieved by a one-sided development of one or the other form of weapon, but by a perfection of all types of forces and a skilful organization of their combined effect.

The first reaction to the announcement of atomic bombs in the foreign Press is characterized by a "stunned feeling, mixed with relief over the fact that this new weapon was used by the Allies, and not by their enemies." However, as Manchester Guardian points out, "the feeling of satisfaction over this latest achievement of the Allies is obscured by fear of its future consequences." This "fear", is apparently fanned by certain circles who strive to use it for their own interests.

"In the Press of the United States and England, various tendencies appear as to the estimation of possible consequences of the atomic bomb discovery.

"The progressive Press emphasizes that the enormous potentialities of military utilization of atomic energy make it all the more imperative

for the United Nations to work for the conservation of peace and prevent the possibility of future wars. The Labor Party organ, Daily Herald, stated in a lead article entitled 'The last warning': 'The atomic bomb is the last warning to mankind. Humanity now has the means of self-destruction. The invention of the atomic bomb raises the question: should we not make all efforts to impart a real meaning to the foundations of international cooperation, which were laid at San Francisco: Can our judging capacity and our knowledge develop as rapidly as technical progress is developing?

The last question of the Labor newspaper seems to be directed against those people in the United States and England who have made new attacks against cooperation of the United Nations in connection with discovery of atomic bombs. The opinions of such people prove a lack of understanding of the real international situation. However, these opinions deserve some attention because they reflect the desires of certain circles, pursuing their selfish interests and opposed to a firm peace between the nations.

"The reactionary part of the American Press insists that the United States should keep the manufacture of atomic bombs as a secret, in anticipation of future wars. Some isolationist circles frankly state that inasmuch as the United States split the atom, they can also split the United Nations.

"The isolationist Daily News writes: The largest known deposits of uranium are found in Canada (which, as a matter of fact, does not correspond to the facts.-M.R.) This means that Canada will serve its own

interests, besides ours, in supplying us with the required quantity of uranium and not supplying it to other countries... With regard to uranium, Canada must become our complete and only ally. If she refuses, we still have advantages in the field of atomic bomb production as compared with the rest of the world, and one could probably find enough patriotic Americans to force Canada to act correctly with regard to their uranium.

"This statement of a profascist newspaper needs no comment. However, what would be the reason for 'patriotic Americans' to lay hands on Candaian uranium? An answer to this question is contained in the weekly paper United States News, which states that the monopolistic ownership of atomic bombs gives the United States the possibility to 'conquer the world and rule over it, if they so desire.'

"Many other newspapers of Hearst, McCormick and Patterson, have published articles written in the same vein. They openly demand that the United States should guarantee its world rulership by threatening other countries with atomic bombs. These outspoken imperialists do not think of the failure of Hitler's plans for world rulership, which also were based on temporary advantages in the development of military technique and nevertheless suffered a complete collapse."

"Ann MacCormick in New York Times writes: 'For a short period of time, the United States will control the weapon, which is more dangerous as an instrument of politics than the victory itself.' From this she draws the conclusion that the United States should 'take over the leader—ship of the world.'

"life Magazine states that the atomic bomb strengthens the diplomatic position of the United States, making it possible to enforce universal peace 'on the basis of true cooperation.' To eliminate all doubts as to what is meant by 'true cooperation', the magazine accompanies its statement by directing violent attacks against the Soviet Union.

"Similar opinions were voiced in the English Press. The conservative newspaper Observer declares that 'the possession of the atomic bomb secret guarantees American and English superiority, at least at the present time'. According to many English newspapers, all details on the production of atomic bombs are to be found only in the United States.

"Emery, former Minister for Indian and Burmese Affairs, goes even further. In the pages of the <u>Sunday Chronicle</u> he states that at present the United States of America 'from the point of view of power politics, can rule the world. In comparison, the Soviet Union is only a vulnerable, secondary power.' In spite of the fact that the majority of the English people has clearly expressed their views of the 'Munich' policy, their representatives continue to repeat the foolish statements of Hitler regarding 'vulnerability' and 'secondary role of the Soviet Union. It is true that the 'judging capacity' of some political representatives is definitely unable to keep up with technical progress'.

"In all fairness it should be said that such views on utilizing the atomic bomb for establishing American (or Anglo-American) world rulership are expressed by comparatively narrow, although very loud-voiced groups of reactionaries. More widely expressed are vague discussions on the

subject of the atomic bomb, stating that with its invention it has become necessary to re-formulate international problems, as the former agreements between powers have become obsolete. Statements of this kind can be harmful only because of their ambiguity. Without finding out why the former agreements have become 'obsolete', such statements can only cause unnecessary confusion in the minds of trusting people. However, one must not forget that questions of world defense are political questions. They must be not considered only from a military-technical angle, without considering political, economical and social factors.

"It is evident that sound-minded politicians and journalists understand this fact, as it appears from certain publications which are opposed to imperialistic propaganda. Thus, for instance, Daily Herald, in contradiction to Daily Mail, points out that in many other countries besides England and the United States, there are scientists who have studied the problem of splitting the atom and who will now work with doubled energy, in an effort to produce a weapon which is equal, or even superior, to that of the English and Americans. This newspaper is of the opinion that 'the atmosphere of secrecy and suspicion brings discord into international relations,' and asks for an immediate agreement on international control of production and utilization of atom bombs between representatives of the Big Five.

"The greatest English physicist Chadwick, who took active part in the development of the atomic bombs, stated: 'The utilization of atomic energy in one form or another will require international control. The basic technical principles of atomic bombs have become so well known that from now on it is only a question of time necessary for any country to produce atomic bombs (even without publication of the secrets of England and the United States).'

England and America who rejoice at the thought of Anglo-American monopoly in the production of atomic bombs, as they have hopes of a conflict arising between the Soviet Union and the western powers. However, Tribune states that 'any attempts to maintain this monopoly will lead to disastrous consequences.' Therefore, Tribune suggests that production of atom bombs should be under international control.

"The progressive organs of English and American Press emphasize the fact that the agreements between the big powers are now even more important than before. Manchester Guardian writes: '.. the ideal guardian of the new weapon and its means of production can only be an international organization, whose duty it is to uphold the peace.'

has surpassed English and American science in many fields, and draws the conclusion that the salvation of humanity does not lie in the competition of science of various countries. Only the development of an international system makes it possible for all the nations of the world to use the advantages of this overwholming discovery.

"The progressive representatives of the American public demand immediate action in strengthening the United Nations as a stronghold against the danger of a new agression.

"According to Associated Press news from Washington, many Republican and Democratic Senators have expressed the opinion that after the war in the Pacific has come to an end, the United States should share their knowledge of atomic energy with other countries through the United Nations.

"The foreign Press also discusses the question of the possibilities of world utilization of atomic energy. A number of American papers are filled with sensational articles on miracles to be performed in the very near future with a few grams of 'atomic fuel', etc. However, most of the scientists who have worked on the development of the atomic bomb, oppose these sensational articles and warn against the illusions of an immediate practical utilization of atomic energy in industry. A number of persons who had a leading part in the scientific research work point out that this work was almost completely devoted to questions of military utilization. Therefore, the problem of using atomic energy in industry will require a long period of intensive research. On a small scale, research work on the utilization of atomic energy in peace is being done by the scientific research department of a college in Iowa. However, this cannot be compared in any way with the work done on the development of the atomic bomb.

"We see that the general attitude towards world utilization of atomic energy is very restrained. Radio commentator Allister Cook

remarked that business men in the United States, especially heads of petroleum concerns, mining industry, power industry, etc., are greatly worried over the latent possibilities of the new invention.

"The Workers' Press of the United States warns against the danger which will arise if the utilization of scientific achievements in the field of atomic energy should be entrusted to monopolistic corporations.

"The invention of atomic bombs makes it more imperative to mobilize all progressive forces in order to guarantee world peace and security for great and small nations. However, it is obvious that this invention does not solve any political problems either within individual countries or on an international scale. Anyone who has illusions in this regard will be greatly disappointed.

"True international cooperation in the field of science should be organized on a large scale as soon as possible, which is one way of developing mutual understanding of all freedom-loving nations of the world."

Pravda — 9 Sept 1945 (International Review)

Rumania, and Hungary, the newspaper New York Times places great hopes on "the strength of American democracy, which showed itself in the role the United States played in the victories over Europe and Asia, the apotheosis of which was expressed in the atom bomb. Therefore... the atom bomb and the future help from the United States, is like a powerful hammer held over the peoples of the Balkan countries! This is what the New York Times has finally succeeded in saying.

Signed: The Observer

# Pravda — 21 Sept 1945

Deputy Chief of the U.S. Air Forces, Lt. General Ecker [sic], made the following statement to the Commission on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives. "The United States must maintain a comparatively small but very highly efficient air force. It is necessary to continue the research work."

In regard to the question of the future air force, Ecker states mone should fully take into account the new, extremely important military inventions."

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Izvestiya — 9 Oct 1945 Pravda — 10 Oct 1945

In connection with an amnouncement from Washington that United States scientists are protesting against the secrecy surrounding the atom bomb, the English newspaper Evening News published an article stating that English scientists were also being organized in the fight against misuse of the great discovery. One of the well-known scientists, who had been working on the atom bomb, told a newspaper correspondent: "The scientists of England feel that inasmuch as neither the political nor the military powers are apparently inclined to take charge of this discovery, the scientists themselves should come out into the open and widely inform, the public of the social and international importance of the atom bomb. We do not intend to stay in our laboratories and keep silent. Therefore, the scientists who feel a responsibility, intend to prepare a joint declaration regarding the atom bomb. They have split the atom for the purpose of having this discovery used to the benefit of mankind, and not in order to cause a catastrophe. Now is the time when we should definitely decide how to express in the best possible way all of our present experiences and feelings. Many outstanding scientists will participate in the declaration."

The newspaper assumed that the declaration would be published in one or two weeks.

Izvestiya, 8 Sept. 1945.

S. Vivilov, Pres. of Academy of Sciences.

"Science and the New Five-Year Plan."

"The war strikingly hastened the technical realization of radiolocation, physical mines (magnetic, acoustic, hydrodynamic, photoelectric), guided shells and aircraft, and finally the uranium bomb."

"In the forthcoming Five-year plan it is necessary, undoubtedly, to radically reconsider questions of fuel and energy. Aside from the problem of the use of energy within the atom, which became a complete reality since the development of the atomic bomb and which promises an unheard-of technical revolution primarily in the field of energy, it is necessary to indicate many incomparably more unpretentious, but actually extremely important energy problems." — gas, coal, coke, etc.



Pravda — 10 October 1945

According to the correspondent of Associated Press, President Truman delivered a speech at a special press conference in Tiptonville, Tennessee. Truman stated that the United States does not intend to reveal the secret of the atom bomb to any country whatsoever. He also stated that he did not consider the Conference of Foreign Ministers to have been a failure and pointed out that the interests of the United States did not collide with the interests of the Soviet Union, but that sometimes the differences in language and translation caused difficulties.

Trud - 28 Oct 1945

In a speech delivered by President Truman on Navy Day, he made the following statements. In regard to the assertion that the invention of the atomic bomb eliminates the necessity of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, Truman stated that at the present time all these discussions are 100 percent in error and that there is no substitute whatsoever for the Navy. He stated further: "A Navy equipped with all forms of weapons provided by science is still dedicated to its historic task: to keep guard over the ocean approaches to our country and the sky above them. The atomic bomb does not change the principles of United States foreign policy. It only makes the development and realization of our policy more imperative and urgent than we could have expected six months ago."

Truman declared that the discussion of the atomic bomb question with Great Britain and Canada, and later on with other countries, can not be postponed until the official formation of the United Nations Organization. "This discussion, which aims at a free exchange of basic scientific information, will begin in the near future. However, I emphasize once more, as I have done in the past, that this discussion will not touch the production processes of the atomic bomb or any other military weapon."



# Pravda - 7 Nov 1945

(From Molotov's address at the meeting of the Moscow Soviet, 6 Nov 1945)

"....great secrets cannot remain the monopoly of any country...."

Pravda - 8 Nov 1945

British and US comments on Molotov's speech.

Pravda — 9 Nov 1945

US comments on Molotov's speech.

(Nost of the US articles quoted in these two numbers of Pravda mention the paragraph dealing with atomic energy and comment favorably on the statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister.)

Pravda - 9 Nov 1945

In a speech delivered by Churchill in the House of Commons, he made the following statements regarding discoveries in the field of the atomic bomb: "I hope that England, Canada, and the United States will follow the policy announced by President Truman and will consider their knowledge and their methods as a secret pledge." Churchill added: "I also agree that it would be a 100 percent error to think that the existence of the bomb eliminates the necessity of the Army, Navy, and Air Force."

Pravda — 11 Nov 1945 (International Review)

"...the secret of the atomic bomb as a means of pressure on the

USSR.."

"...atomic diplomacy.."

Trud — 17 Nov 1945

Text of joint statement by Truman, Attlee and McKenzie King
(Two paragraphs: first deals with necessity for keeping atomic
bomb production secret; second discusses establishment of a Control
Commission.)

(Total, 24 lines)

Sportin

Trud - 20 Nov 1945

(Comments from the American press on the Trumen-Attlee-McKenzie King statement)

New York - 16 Nov 1945 (TASS)

PM: "The establishment of a commission under the United Nations control will place the USSR on the same level with that of Portugal and Argentina, leaving the US and Great Britain in lead positions."

Smith, a radio commentator, declared that the Anglo-American statement "provides for the release by the Allies to Russia of a secret which actually is not a secret, and requires that Russia follow a policy outlined by Washington and London. It is doubtful that Russia would accept such a deal."

<u>Daily Worker</u>: "...atom club...atomic bloc...Secret traded for the acceptance of the Anglo-American dictatorship...Everybody knows that only unity between the United States and the USSR can prevent war."

# ARTICLE BY B.Z. BELEN'KIY "FISSION OF THE ATOMIC NUCLEUS"

As reported in Nauka i Zhizn, No. 10, October 1945 Page 12 Extracts

On 6 August 1945 the world learned of the use of the atom bomb against Japan by the USAF. The havor wreaked by this bomb was colossal. The explosion of uranium is 20 million times more violent than the explosion of a similar amount of the most powerful explosive known heretofore. The pillar of smoke and dust over the target areas rose to an altitude of 12 kilometers. Three fifth's of the town, whose population was about 300,000, was reduced to a virtual graveyard.

Facts gleaned from foreign press reports lead one to believe that the atomic bomb operates on the principle of a "chain reaction" by mutrons in the light uranium isotope - U - 235. English and U. S. scientists have discovered an efficient method for isolating the U-235 from ordinary uranium. The explosive substance appears to be a combination of U-235 and heavy water. Heavy water is necessary in order to bring about the "chain" reaction by slowing down the speed of neutrons.

The study of intra-atomic forces is a new field. There is no doubt that some day nuclear energy will be utilized for peaceful aims. It is difficult to forecast the changes in our civilization which will be brought about by the use of this energy.

Above extracts which contain all data pertaining to subject requirement comprise 10% of the total article and are the last three paragraphs.

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#### SPEECH BY V.M. MOLOTOV

#### GIVEN AT THE TRIUMPHAL SESSION OF THE MOSCOW COUNCIL

As reported in Nauka i Zhizn, No. 11-12 December 1945 Extracts

The entrance of the forces of the USSR brought about a rapid conclusion to hostilities in the Far East.

Peace can be maintained by well organized armed forces. This is particularly true in the case of those nations who have to guarantee world peace. But safeguarding the peace is in no way related to the political imperialistic designs of certain foreign nations. In this connection it is necessary to mention the development of atomic energy and the atomic bomb, the use of which in the struggle against Japan revealed its great destructive power. Atomic energy, however, has not proven itself in the attempt to stop aggression or to guarantee the peace. However, under present conditions there are no technological secrets which can be monopolized by any one country for any length of time. Therefore the discovery of atomic energy can not be used effectively for any considerable length of time either as a factor in the power politics, or as a future threat to peace loving peoples.

At the present time with a remarkable technological achievement such as utilization of atomic energy, a great deal can be accomplished for the people's economy. The war has destroyed a large percentage of our industry, but with hard work our industries will once again flourish. We will even achieve the utilization of atomic energy and much else. (Loud, prolonged enthusiastic applause).

(The above extracts which contain all data pertaining to subject requirement comprise approximately 5% of the total article, and were

interspersed in the beginning, middle, and end of the speech.)

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### SPEECH BY G.I. KOSITSKIY

#### ATOMIC ENERGY IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE

Reported in
Nauka i Zhizn, No. 7
July 1946
Page 12 - 15
Extracts

Intra-atomic energy has been utilized long before the discovery of the important reaction and its utilization for military purposes. The slower processes of atomic fission have been used for many years in medicine and other sciences for humanitarian purposes.

The atomic nucleus has opened a large new field of endeavor.

Only under conditions of Soviet Socialism can the possibilities in this new field be fully utilized for the advantage of humanity.

(The above data, an oblique reference to subject requirement, comprise a small part of the article and are the first and last paragraphs.)



#### Bikini tests

The first Bikini test was reported by the 3 July 1946 edition of all newspapers in a TASS story from New York, based on Associated Press and Reuters reports. The comments by TASS minimized the effect of the bombing. On the same day a feature article on the Bikini test appeared in Pravda, which criticized the expenditure on the test, the results, and the alleged non-scientific nature of the test, and commented upon plans for control of the bomb. No further reaction appeared until July 26, when a TASS report of the underwater test of July 24 was published, again based on an Associated Press story. The effect of the explosion on the ships and the atoll was minimized.

APPENDIX DE



#### SOVIET RADIO REACTIONS TO:

1. The First	Use of the Atomic Bomb Against Japan:	
2. The Merck	Report on Biological Warfare:	
3. Formestall	a Page 1 7	
23 TOTTEBUAL	s Recent Press Release on Biological War	fare.

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6 April 1949

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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#### SUMMARY

Initial Soviet reaction to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave the appearance of casual and unexcited observation. The first monitored reference to the military significance of the bomb did not appear until 16 August 1945, nine days after Truman's first announcement of the atom bomb's use. From this date, and continuing until Molotov's 6 November 1945 address on the anniversary of the October Revolution, the relatively few Soviet comments on the atomic bomb fell into two phases. The first phase, coinciding with Soviet propaganda efforts to build up the Red Army's campaign in Manchuria, consisted of brief but pointed references which implicitly belittled the military effectiveness of the "sensational" invention, in comparison with the Red Army's "crushing blows."

These references declined markedly at the end of August 1945, and were superseded in September and October by a second phase, in which the political implications of the atomic bomb were considered. Commentaries pointing out the increased need for "international collaboration" as a result of "this greatest discovery of science" acknowledged, by implication, the destructive power of the bomb. However, it was not until Molotov's 6 November 1945 address (in which the phrase "tremendous destructive power" occurred) that this fact was given explicit expression, together with statements to the effect that the bomb cannot remain the exclusive property of "any one country." Except for a fleeting reference to the fact that President Truman "indicated that the Soviet Union had agreed to enter the Pacific War before he had mentioned the existence of the new weapon," Soviet broadcasts did not

touch on the question of the bomb in relation to Allied military collaboration.

No reference to the Merck Report has appeared in available Soviet radio news releases or commentaries for the relevant periods of 1946; and to date, no notice of Forrestal's 12 March press statement on biological warfare has appeared. Vague allusions to the potentialities of biological warfare do appear in a recent commentary by Ilya Ehrenburg. Ehrenburg's statements, however, depart from the characteristic Soviet propaganda pattern which has tended to avoid concretereference to the development of new military tactics and weapons either by the Soviet Union or by other countries.

Data for this report were obtained from the following radio troadcast sources:

FBIS DAILY REPORTS: 6 August 1945 to 12 November 1945; 4 January 1946 to 28 February 1946, 25 May 1946 to 15 June 1946

BBC 1:0NITORING REPORTS (Daily): 6 August 1945 to 31 Lugust 1945; 6 November 1945 to 12 November 1945; 4 January 1946 to 10 January 1946; 25 May 1946 to 15 June 1946

SCVIET MONITOR (TASS publication): 8, 9, and 10 August 1945; 7 and 8 November 1945

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- I. INITIAL SOVIET REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ATOMIC BOMB
- a. Reports of President Truman's 7 August (1945) Statement: On 7 August, Radio Moscow reported that "all papers" had published President Truman's statement on the first use of the atomic bomb; and the Soviet radio's morning news programs included the President's statement in full. The FBIS DAILY REPORT "Survey" noted, however, that attendant publicity was "unexciting and unspeculative." The statement itself did not receive news-priority in Soviet broadcasts of 7 August; for example, a press review placed the statement last in a series of four news items, and it ranked thirteenth in a series of TASS news releases beamed to the Soviet provincial press. (On the other hand, a CBS commentator reported from Moscow that "everybody is talking about the atom bomb."\*)
- b. The Bomb and Soviet "Precipitation" of the Japanese Surrender: There was no mention of the bomb either in the Soviet declaration of war against Japan or in any monitored Soviet broadcasts of 8 August, which were almost entirely devoted to the latter event.\*\* The Soviet-controlled Berlin radio broadcast a press review, however, which featured TAEGLICHE RUNDSCHAU's comment that "the U.S. Government will take all requisite measures to prevent the misuse of the atomic bomb" and that "the release of energy by atomic fission is to serve, first and foremost, the cause of peace." (8 August 1945)

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<sup>\*</sup> On the evening of 7 August 1945, the date of President Truman's statement announcing the use of the first atomic bomb against Japan, Farnsworth Fowle, CBS commentator, reported as follows from Moscow: "Everybody is talking about the atomic bomb. ... The Soviet public ... has been quick to appreciate the significance of this revolutionary discovery. Reports of its results in combat will be awaited with great interest."

The first recorded reference to the atomic bomb in a Radio Moscow commentary\* appeared in Mihailov's 9 August 1945 reply to an American commentator who disparaged the Soviet declaration of war against Japan. As the following excerpts indicate, Mihailov deprecatingly alludes to, but does not develop, the issue of the bomb's effect on the balance of world power--an issue said to have been raised by the "ill-wishers":

"Two or three voices have been heard uttering the thought that 'after all, Russia's taking part in the war against Japan can alter practically nothing.' ... Mr. Gurney of the National Broadcasting Company... declared right away that the invention of the atomic bomb considerably lessened the influence the Soviet Union's entry into the Pacific war would have. He went on to say that the atomic bomb was a weapon for the dissemination of democracy and that its creation sharply changed Anglo-Soviet-American relations, as it deprived Russia of that influential situation which she formerly enjoyed.

"It seems to us that Mr. Gurney, on whom the Berlin Conference decisions apparently had a distinctly adverse effect, has misunderstood the significance of the atomic bomb. Judging by the way it is being used, it is meant for the enemies of democracy, the enemies of America, Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and the rest of the United Nations. After an anti-Allied statement like that, it is hard to believe that Mr. Gurney is a democrat by conviction." (in English to the United Kingdom, 9 August 1945)

A few days later, Soviet Prof. Yerusalimsky barely touches the question of the effect of the atomic bomb upon Allied military collaboration. In an approving review of President Truman's 9 August radio address on the Potsdam conference, he notes that the President "underscored the importance of close collaboration between the three great democratic powers." The President emphasized, Moscow's commentator continues, that the "fighting partner—ship" had been "further sealed" by the Soviet declaration of war against Japan; and the President also "indicated that the Soviet Union had agreed to enter the Pacific war before he had mentioned the existence of the new weapon." (in English to North America, 12 August 1945)

It was not until 16 August that a recorded Soviet broadcast appraised the military significance of the atomic bomb. Against a background of heavy propaganda emphasis on the Red Army campaign in Manchuria, an IZVESTIA "International Review" implicitly belittled American press claims for the effectiveness of the "sensational atomic bomb." IZVESTIA's article began by stressing that the Red Army's operations against the Kwantung Army were of the "greatest significance" in bringing about the Japanese surrender, and

<sup>\*</sup>As distinguished from a news report.

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it concluded with the following "reminder" to those who, it implies, overestimate the effectiveness of the atomic bomb:

"Some American papers attempt to minimize the contribution of the Soviet Union to the common Allied cause. Thus the New York DAILY NEWS blustered: 'We could win the war with the help of atomic bombs.' The sensation of the atomic bomb has truly obscured the world from the eyes of some people. They are ready to turn science into Voodoo witch-craft. It is worth reminding them of the very sober remark made by Mountbatten in London. ... He said (on 9 August): 'It would be supreme put an end to war.' The end of the war was not produced by sensational Home Service, 16 August 1945]

Following IZVESTIA's lead, a minor flurry of similar references to the relative merits of the atomic bomb and the Red Army appeared in Soviet broadcasts of 17 and 18 August 1945. In a Spanish-language broadcast of a lauded. The Japanese reserves, Viktorov asserted, "could not properly have been touched by naval forces, flying fortresses, or even by the sensational atomic bomb." (17 August 1945) For Soviet audiences, Gen. Chennault was quoted as having said "that the Soviet Union's entry into the war against That would have been so even if no atomic bombs were used." (Melnikov, provincial press, 18 August 1945) Chennault's statement was again mentioned Soviet Home Service, 11 September 1945.

c. The Political Implications of the Atomic Bomb: With this vindication of the Red Army's "decisive" exploits, the Soviet radio turned its attention from the Japanese war, the BBC noted. No further reference to the atomic bomb appeared until 4 September; and beginning with this date, the context shifted from the military to the political implications of the bomb. TASS implicitly reopened the subject of the atomic bomb with its official denial of a WASHINGTON POST report that uranium shares in Canada "were bought up, Service, 4 September 1945)

On the same day, an English-language broadcast paired two implicitly contradictory viewpoints on the atomic bomb; a NEW TIMES military expert "criticizes" attempts to "exaggerate" the bomb; while a commentary by Rubenstein, on the other hand, "demands" increased "international cooperation" as necessitated by "this greatest discovery of science":

Col. Tolchanov's article entitled 'The End of the War in the Pacific' convincingly criticizes the attempts of various circles abroad to exaggerate the significance of the atomic bomb." (NEW TIMES)

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"A special review, 'The Foreign Press on the Atomic Bomb,' by Rubenstein, is also devoted to this question. Basing this review on a rich arsenal of facts, Rubenstein shows that the reactionary forces and out-and-out imperialists are attempting to utilize the atomic bomb for their own dark ends. Progressive humanity, on the contrary, demands in connection with the invention of the atomic bomb the strengthening of international cooperation. The author of the review states: 'The invention of the atomic bomb gives even more reason for mobilizing all progressive forces to guarantee a lasting and stable peace, and security for all nations, the very possibility of utilizing the boundless forces of atomic energy, demands international cooperation in the field of science—a highly all freedom—loving peoples the world over."

A fuller version of Rubenstein's article, broadcast in Italian, referred to the "Hearst and McCormick" press as advocating that "the U.S. should secure bomb." But other segments of the Anglo-U.S. press were said to have confact this "short-sighted" viewpoint"; they point out that "apart from the sttempt at preserving this monopoly, in the best of cases, is temporary, any Equally short-sighted, Rubenstein stressed, is "the opinion that the invention placed all international problems on a different basis, with the result that

A further allusion to the bomb as a political weapon appeared in a PRAVDA article which mildly reproved the NEW YORK TIMES for its "stubbornness" in Rumania. In illustration of the paper's lack of judgment, PRAVDA cited the

"The NEW YORK TIMES places great hopes on the strength of American democracy, which found its expression in the role played by the United States in the victory in Europe and Asia, the apotheosis of which is the atomic bomb. It also bases its hopes on the fact that the whole world expects to receive aid from the U.S. (regarding) the atomic bomb: (it hopes) that U.S. aid (will be used) as a lever of pressure against the peoples of the Balkan countries. This is how the NEW YORK TIMES reveals itself." (Soviet Home Service, 9 September 1945)

Emphasis on the necessity for "international collaboration" continued as the pattern of recorded Soviet references to the atomic bomb until Molotov, in his address on the 28th anniversary (1945) of the Revolution, refers to its

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"Tremendous destructive power." All recorded references to the subject made during October 1945 are included in the following excerpts:

"London, October, 7 TASS-In connection with reports from Washington which say that U.S. scientists are protesting against the secrecy which is surrounding the atom bomb, the EVENING NEWS published a report which said that prominent British scientists are also organizing themselves for a struggle against abuse of the great discovery. One of the well-known scientists who worked on the stom type stated...: British scientists feel that as long as no politician or military authorities are apparently inclined to occupy themselves with this discovery, the scientists themselves must speak and inform the people of the social and international significance of the atom bomb. We do not intend to sit silent in our laboratories. ... Scientists... intend to make a joint declaration on the atom bomb. They split the atom so that this discovery of it." (TASS, to the USSR provincial press, 8 October 1945)

(The above report is also summarized in a Soviet Home Service press

An FBIS summary of a commentary by "Analyzer" of 12 October, stated that "Analyzer" stressed the importance of the "problem of atomic energy" in view of the failure of the London Foreign Ministers' conference. He criticized Anglo-U.S. press commentators who "envisage the atomic bomb as a weapon that will safeguard the interest of their country better than any international cooperation," and makes the following points in rebuttal: (1) Need one point out that atomic bombs and other terrific weapons of war such as, for instance, those mentioned the other day by Generals Marshall and Arnold, are liable to be used of humanity craving for a really lasting peace can be satisfied only if, friendly settlement of urgent problems and all-round collaboration. (in English to the United Kingdom, 12 October 1945)

Osipov, advertising Soviet policy as "the mainstay of international collaboration," made the following references to the atomic bomb: "Every passing day makes the warmongers more cynical and outspoken. It is already being proposed that the atomic bomb should influence the foreign policy of the United States. Yalchin, a Turkish journalist, urges the U.S. not to waste this opportunity but to take advantage of time while it has a monopoly of the atomic bomb secret. He demands from the Anglo-Saxons ultimatums to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, based on the threat of the atomic bomb. Obviously, you cannot build a stable and lasting peace on a basis like that. That is why the USSR has been calling so persistently for Great Power collaboration, which it regards as the principal factor in maintaining peace and friendship among nations."

d. Comment on Molotov's 6 November 1945 Reference to the Atomic Bomb: In his address on the 28th anniversary of the October Revolution, Molotov noted the tremendous destructive power" of the atomic bomb. As may be seen from the foregoing account, this was the first explicit admowledgment of the bomb's destructiveness to appear in recorded Soviet radio commentaries. Molotov's estimate of the bomb was coupled with a reminder that it cannot "remain the property of any one country":

"The interests of safeguarding the peace have nothing in common with the policy of an armaments race between the Great Powers, which is being preached abroad by certain...(imperialists). Reference should be made, in this connection, to the discovery of atomic energy and the atomic bomb, the use of which in the war against Japan demonstrated its tremendous destructive power. However, atomic energy has not as yet been tried in the task of preventing aggression and of safeguarding the peace.

"On the other hand, there can now exist no such large-scale technical secrets which can remain the property of any one country or any narrow grouping of states. For this reason, the discovery of atomic energy should not encourage either enthusiasm regarding the use of this discovery in the interplay of forces in the sphere of foreign policy, or light-heartedness regarding the future of the peace-loving nations. ...

"In our era of high technical achievements and wide application of science in production, when it has already become possible to utilize atomic energy, our plans (stress raising the technical level of industry and the training of) highly qualified technical cadres.

"The enemy has interfered with our peaceful creative work, but we will make up for it all and we will achieve the flourishing of our country. We will have atomic energy, and much else! ..."

The theme of subsequent Soviet radio comment on Molotov's address was the "determination to achieve a stable peace that was expressed (in his) speech." Comment on the portions of his speech dealing with Soviet economic plans similarly generalized on the "tremendous creative energy that will have to be expended," without explicit references to the development and use of atomic

A few broadcasts, however, noted Molotov's remarks concerning atomic energy, utilizing foreign press comments to emphasize the wisdom of the Foreign Minister's words. A Soviet "radio analyzer," for example, pointed out that "Molotov's words (about) the discovery of atomic energy" as a force in world politics were "in line" with the "Soviet policy to maintain and safeguard peace." (in English to North America, 7 November 1945)

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Explicit reference to the atomic bomb itself appeared only in quotations from foreign press comments on Molotov's speech. Recorded Soviet broadcasts on his speech cite the following:

"REUTERS comments that, since Molotov's mention of atomic energy, the atomic bomb has again become the main topic of discussion throughout the world. Molotov was undoubtedly right, say the DATLY TELEGRAPH and MORNING POST, when he declared that Russia would have her own atomic energy." (Soviet Home Service, 7 November; and in English to North

"Molotov's speech was given wide publicity by the U.S. press. Most of the papers regard the speech as an important contribution to the cause of peace. In speaking about Molotov's references to the atomic bomb and in regard to blocs, the UNITED PRESS political observer points out that many observers consider Molotov's frankness as particularly timely, since it will aid in removing the atmosphere of suspicion and lay the 8 November 1945)

On the other hand, a negative comment from the London ECONCMIST is employed to point up the "embarrassment" of those who had hoped to use the atomic bomb as an instrument of political coercion:

"The ECONOMIST, ...one of the most zealous supporters of the notorious atomic energy. The ECONOMIST gives away what it obviously wanted to hide most of all; that is, its desire to use the atomic bomb as an the Soviet Union. ... The tendency showed by the ECONOMIST and 11 November 1945)

It is of interest to note that at the time of Molotov's speech, one of the most explicit discussions of the problem of atomic energy appeared in the form of a review of a speech by Bevin to the British House of Commons on the subject of President Truman's 12 points. Bevin, the Soviet Home Service energy in the immediate future. He is said to have added:

"I believe that so far the use of atomic energy in industry is costly, but it gives us time to create the organization of the United Nations for peacetime efforts, and as this energy is absorbed into industry the necessity for using it for atomic bombs will disappear with the creation of a new international security organization." (Soviet Home Service,

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## II. EHRENBURG'S ATYPICAL REFERENCE TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

As previously noted, no Soviet radio reference to the Merck Report or to Forrestal's statement of 12 March 1949 on biological warfare has been obtained. (Available monitored Soviet broadcasts have been examined for the periods 3 January 1946 to 28 February 1946; 25 May 1946 to 15 June 1946; and 12 March 1949 to 6 April 1949. However, Ilya Ehrenburg, in a recent commentary on the North Atlantic Pact, alludes to biological warfare and to other developments of military significance. His reference to specific the past two and a half years, which has avoided discussion of a possible war situation in concrete terms. Decrying the claim that the North Atlantic Pact is not aggressive, Ehrenburg cites the following evidence to the contrary:

"They repeat it on all wavelengths, short and long: 'Cur pact is strictly of a defensive nature!' But why, if they think of defense, does Mr. Shafer, the Vice President (sic) of the U.S. Congress Armed Services Committee, announce quietly: 'War with the USSR is inevitable. 'Why do the Americans feverishly erect military bases in the Near East and Greenland, in Japan and in the Philippines? Why does the American-best American flyers have been trained to drop bombs on the industrial possible Russian objectives and suitable routes?

"Why does Gen. Le May, cammander of the long-range air force, say: 'We shall be able to drop the atom bomb on any place in the world! We shall one will know that the bomber has taken off!?

"In their bloodthirsty frenzy, the imperialists are reminiscent of that man (whom the gods made mad in order to destroy). ... William Vogt destruction of the surplus of people with the help of starvation and epidemics.' However, the American military have no confidence in such a artificially.

Ehrenburg makes another allusion to "artificial epidemics" when he denounces the State Department's refusal of visas to prospective French delegates to the recent New York peace conference. He says:

"Any American, whether he be connected with atomic research, or just an ordinary gangster, a breeder of plague microbes, or a swindler, the trainer of a mare called 'Wonder Lady,' or even the mare herself, can freely enter into France..." (Soviet Home Service, 1 April 1949)

(Ehrenburg, it may be noted, has in the past deviated in a number of ways of greedom not granted to his colleagues.)

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## III. MOSCOW'S GENERAL AVOIDANCE OF SPECIFIC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviet radio's marked avoidance of both the atom bomb and biological warfare, during the periods specifically covered by this report, is in line with its treatment of the same topics during other periods also.

Throughout the two years during which FBIB has been reporting systematically on Soviet radio broadcasts (since April 1947) there have not been more than three or four monitored references to biological warfare, and these have been of the vaguest and briefest sort, comparable with Ehrenburg's comments quoted above. Since monitors have been consistently alerted to any mention of biological warfare, the monitored references probably represent in this instance all or nearly all of what has been broadcast on the subject.

As for the atomic bomb, the typical policy has been not to avoid the subject completely but to play it down wherever possible. (For an extended description of the contexts in which the topic has been avoided, and of the techniques of evasion which have been employed when events seemed to necessitate some discussion of it, see SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS, 2 April 1948, No. 38, pp. J 1-3.) The one seeming exception to this generalization was the very strenuous but short-lived campaign to "outlaw" atomic weapons during the U.N. meetings in the fall of 1948. Even this campaign, however, was characterized by an enormous concentration on the simple slogan, "outlaw atomic weapons," as a basis for asserting that the United States was refusing to do so; there was a continuance of the Soviet radio's characteristic evasion of the actual basis of disagreement within the Atomic Energy Commission (See SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS, 1 October 1948, No. 64, pp. A 1-6), and a continued absence of any concrete picture of atomic bombs ready to drop on the Soviet Union (SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS, 19 November 1948, No. 71, p. A 1). Vishinsky's emotional warning of an Vatomic Pearl Harbor," publicized by the American press, was not publicized or paralleled in any way by the Soviet Radio, and Vishinsky himself did not repeat it.

As far as the dangerous character of the bomb is concerned, attention has been focused on its necessarily "aggressive" character (as one more proof of the aggressive intentions of the "ruling circles" in the west) rather than on the effectiveness of the weapon as such. One broadcast, for instance, denounced it as "not a means of defense but of piratical attack, a means of the wholesale slaughter of civilians and the destruction of big cities" (SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS, 19 November 1948, No. 71, p. A 1). When the question of the bomb's destructive power has been directly touched upon at all, it has been in brief ridicule of the idea that a war could now be won by any "wonder-weapon"; this theory is compared with Hitler's Blitzkrieg ideas, and is dismissed as equally fallacious.

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It may also be noted that the typical absence of concrete reference to an atomic danger threatening the USSR is paralleled by two other general characteristics of the Soviet propaganda output: an absence of any material which might frighten the Soviet audience with the prespect of imminent war, and an absence of specific discussion of military strategy, tactics or techniques as developed either by the Soviet Union or by the west. For instance, the initial Congressional controversy over a 70-group air force was not reported; the strength of Soviet land forces as compared with the land forces now in western Europe has been barely mentioned; in recent discussion of Norway and the Atlantic Pact, there has been little or no strategic discussion of Norway's special advantages as an air base against the Soviet Union; and the recent round-the-world flight of "Lucky Lady II" is not mentioned even by Ehrenburg, who quotes, in another context (see above), from Gen. Le May's statement in which he reported the flight.